AFRICOM IN CONTEXT

The leading scholar on the new US Africa Unified Command (AFRICOM), Daniel Volman, accurately summarizes the Obama administration’s foreign policy towards Africa in writing that it is continuing “the expansion of US military activity on the continent initiated by President Bill Clinton in the late 1990s and dramatically escalated by President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2009.”1In fact, the Obama administration has already made significant increases in funding for virtually every US military program concerning Africa in the FY 2010 budget. In addition, it has expanded direct US military operations on the continent, particularly in Nigeria, Mali, and Somalia.2 These developments qualify as additional evidence for “Obama’s continuity with George W. Bush’s foreign policy,” as demonstrated recently by Edward S. Herman in Z magazine.3

The current direction of US-Africa relations is by no means unexpected given one of the more significant changes to the US military structure implemented during the George W. Bush administration: the October 1st, 2008 addition of the sixth US unified command, AFRICOM. Prior to its establishment, five unified commands coordinated, integrated, and managed all US defense assets and operations for their respective regions. Africa fell under the responsibility of three different commands: European Command (EU- COM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). Each viewed Africa as a “secondary or even tertiary concern.”4 Thus, as “Africa’s position in the US strategic spectrum...moved from peripheral to central,”5 AFRICOM was established to take over all US military assets and operations conducted on the continent (with the exception of Egypt) in order to achieve a “unity of focus throughout Africa.”6

 

Foreign policy scholars have identified three principal reasons for increased US military focus in Africa: securing key natural resources, responding to China’s growing influence, and garnering strategic position to continue the so-called “war on terror.” The architects of AFRICOM however dismissed these strategic interests as "myths" and instead cast AFRICOM through "the language and aims of humanitarianism" while pursuing a diplomatic campaign back in 2007 in search of African countries to host the command's headquarters. Despite these attempts, citizens and civil society organizations responded to the plan with skepticism, and , with the exception of Liberia, all other traget governments declined to host the new command. In responding to the "image problem" surrounding the campiagn for AFRICOM, one state department official said, "ublic opinion is really against getting into bed with the US. They just don't trust the US." Africa's shift from 'peripheral to central' on Washington's strategic radar, as embodied in the establishment of AFRICOM, is a key component of the changing landscape of US/Africa relations. However, despite declarations from AFRICOM planners about it being a 'different kind of command' that represents a new 'paradigm' in US military engagement, there are significant historical continuities that accompany this change-- continuities that run counter to official declarations and offer critical insight into the militarization of US foreign policy towards Africa. 

 

 

A DIFFERENT KIND OF COMMAND?

 

AFRICOM planners cite two reasons for why the new command is so “different”: first, the command’s overall strategy called “sustained security engagement,” and second, the “interagency coordination” built into the command’s structure.11 According to General Ward, sustained security engagement is a strategy that emphasizes “building African security capability and capacity” with a primary focus on “conflict and crisis prevention rather than reaction.”12 As part of this so-called “preventive strategy,” AFRICOM develops the capability and capacity of military and security forces of allied governments through a wide-range of “security assistance” programs. Such programs include training these forces, providing ally governments with weaponry and additional military equipment, and improving logistical and intelligence capacity.13 In addition, AFRICOM conducts and helps coordinate direct military operations on the continent, particularly in the area of naval operations which have undergone a “significant expansion.”14

 

Through sustained security engagement, AFRICOM aims to counter “the greatest security threats facing Africa,” which General Ward identifies as “enduring conflicts, illicit trafficking, territorial disputes, rebel insurgencies, violent extremists, piracy, and illegal immigration.”15 AFRICOM will also pursue objectives that include: preventing the “unsanctioned possession and proliferation of WMD capabilities and expertise,”ensuring “access and freedom of movement” for the US military throughout the continent, and developing “en-route infrastructure” to better enable the “rapid deployment” of troops from US bases positioned around the world to anywhere the Pentagon needs them.

 

The new command is also intended to be heavily involved in humanitarian, disaster relief and other civilian programs, which is to be facilitated by inter-agency cooperation. AFRICOM's civic military initiatives play an expanded role in what has traditionally fallen under the purview of civilian agencies, namely the Department of State and USAID. As a result, AFRICOM planners sought to implement the 'visionary concept' of integrating civilian personnel into the command's organizational structure to advance collaboration between the Department of Defense and those agencies. However, due to difficulties in recruiting civilian personnel, efforts to build interagency coordination have been largely unsuccessful as nearly all of AFRICOM's personnel are from the military.

 

A larger problem facing coordination between the civilian and military branches comes as a result of the failure to commit proper resources towards developing a functional partnership. This development is consistent with the steep decline in funding for civilian branches of government (particularly USAID) since the end of the Cold War and the steady take-over of aid and development initiatives by the military.19 As M. J. Williams writes in a 2008 International Affairs article, “the State Department and USAID have been rotting financially for almost 20 years. These trends run counter to claims of interagency 'cooperation,' and instead represent a remarkable achievement by the Pentagon; its increased independence from civilian branches in the areas of developing and implementing foreign aid and development programs. As we will see in the following sections, efforts by AFRICOM officials to cast the new commands as a tool for conflict prevention and humanitarianism obscure Washington's more pressing strategic objective-- to radically enhance interventionist capabilities on the African continent. This point ecomes evident when we examine the consistency between AFRICOM's programs and operations, which constitute its strategy of sustained security engagement, with established US military doctrine, specifically the 'counterinsurgency' and 'low intensity conflict' doctrines developed respectively during the Kennedy and Reagan administrations. Hence, this so-called 'experiment that radically rethinks security in the 21st century' is not so “different” after all.21 

 

DOCTRINAL ANTECEDENTS 

 

Immediately after entering office, the Kennedy administration initiated an unprecedented “shift in strategic focus from conventional and nuclear warfare to unconventional forms of conflict" in order to contest the revolutionary movements sweeping the Third World. This shift was the 'first comprehensive effort of the US government to devise a politicomilitary strategic program to deal with guerilla and counterguerilla warfare. The result was the creation of the counterinsurgency doctrine, which utilized indigenous, rather than US, military and security forces to carry out Washington's orders,  as in the case of South Vietnam. The significance of the doctrine was at least twofold: first, it elevated unconventional warfare to a level 'equal in importance to conventional warfare; and second, it emphasized employing the full-arsenal of state power (military, economic, diplomatic, etc.) to shape Third World affairs.

 

Following the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam, foreign policy planners were well aware of the 'pervasive reluctance of American citizens to support overt US intervention in local Third World conflicts.' The Reagan administration responded to the “Vietnam syndrome” by initiating its own “strategic reorientation of the US military establishment.”27 What ensued was a new military doctrine called “low intensity conflict” or “LIC.” The primary significance of the LIC doctrine was that it circumvented the domestic obstacle to US interventionism through, like counterinsurgency, relying on indigenous forces to carry out US sponsored military campaigns with minimal US military presence on ground. One region where Reagan applied the LIC doctrine extensively was Central America, which had devastating consequences for the citizens of these countries. 

 

In a study of the LIC doctrine, Michael Klare highlights where LIC maintains the essential principles of counterinsurgency. These principles include: 

 

weapons transfers and training—providing allies with weaponry and military equipment and training; 

 

direct combat operations—destroying or neutralizing enemy tactical forces and bases, particularly through special operations forces; 

 

military civic action—using military forces in development projects, particularly in rural areas, in order to win popular support for the established government; 

 

psychological operations— enhancing the popular image of the government and isolating and discrediting the insurgent movement through a variety of means, including disseminating propaganda.28

 

Like counterinsurgency, LIC focused on “winning the hearts and minds” of the indigenous population through campaigns that often included exploiting political divisions in the target society.

 

Klare goes on to describe how the LIC doctrine distinguished itself from counterinsurgency through the addition of the following "mission categories":

 

proinsurgency -- sponsoring and supporting anti-Communist insurgencies fighting against enemy governments;

 

peacetime contingency operations -- initiating short-term military activities, such as show-of-force operations, punitive strikes, and rescue missions;

 

terrorism counteraction -- taking defensive and offensive measure to prevent or counter international terrorists;

 

antidrug operations -- attacking and destroying foreign sources of illegal narcotics and curbing the flow of narcotics into the US; and

 

peacekeeping operations  -- using US forces to police cease-fire agreements or serve as a buffer between enemy armies. 

In addition, LIC emphasized rapid deployment  -- the rapid introduction of United States forces to achieve "fast victories through overwhelming strength and firepower,"  and rapid mobility -- the ability of US forces to "shift rapidly from one type of LIC activity to another" -- across great geographical distances.31

 

 HISTORICAL CONTINUITIES 

 

Despite the preponderance of Cold War rhetoric present in LIC articulations, AFRICOM’s strategy of sustained security engagement is consistent in many ways with the full LIC “spectrum,” particularly if we replace the Cold War pretext for intervention with more current pretexts, such as the “war on terror.” Thus, in adhering to the principles of counterinsurgency, AFRICOM provides military and security training through a variety of programs, such as the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. Weapons and military/ security equipment are being transferred to governments through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), other programs. AFRICOM conducts psychological operations on the continent through “Operation Objective Voice,” which leverages media capabilities to disseminate propaganda.32

 

As mentioned in the introduction, the new command is currently coordinating direct military operations in Mali, Somalia, and Nigeria. For example, US ships are increasingly being deployed off the coast of Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region (a region that provides 10 percent of total US oil imports) to prevent oil-theft and the sabotage of oil exploitation facilities owned by various multinational oil companies.33 AFRICOM also engages in civic military initiatives, such as its HIV/AIDS program which aims to prevent the escalation of HIV/AIDS infection rates within African military and security forces.34 

 

Where LIC extends beyond the scope of counterinsurgency, AFRICOM’s strategy and objectives adhere closely. For example, in bringing the “war on drugs” to the continent, the Obama administration is asking for the first time to provide funding through International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLEP) to countries participating in the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership. In the area of peacetime contingency operations, the Obama administration has authorized Special Forces operations in Somalia, which have resulted in the killing of an alleged al Qaeda member. To wage the current 'war on terror,' AFRICOM conducts a variety of programs and operations through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program (ATA), established in 1983 during the first 'war on terror." These programs include: Operation Enduring Freedom --- Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), a program conducted by special operations forces to deny "safe havens to terrorists," and the Global Equip and Train program, which permits the Pentagon to provide training and equipment to foreign military, police, and other security forces to combat terrorism with minimal congressional oversight. In fact, funding for antiterrorism programs in Africa have increased significantly in Obama's FY 2010 budget.

 

With respect to rapid mobility and deployment, it has already been mentioned that one of AFRICOM's objectives  is to develop "en-route infrastructure" to better enable rapid deployment of US troops from the homeland to anywhere the Pentagon needs them. This objective has been furthered through the recent increase in military "base access agreements" with African governments. According to Daniel Volman, these agreements grant US “access to local military bases and other facilities so that they can be used by American forces as transit bases or as forward operating bases for combat, surveillance, and other military operations.”38 

 

Though only a preliminary comparison between AFRICOM’s strategy and the counterinsurgency and LIC doctrines, we can see that there are significant historical continuities that challenge official declara- tions describing AFRICOM as a “different kind of command” or a radical post-Cold War “experiment.” Instead, such declarations should be viewed as a response to the “image problem” the US military faces in Africa, with the ultimate aim of obscuring what is apparent: that AFRICOM is instrumental in Washington’s quest to subordinate African states to US imperial dominance through employing the full arsenal of US state power, including direct military intervention if the need arises. 

 

 

NOTES 

 

 

1 Daniel Volman, “Obama moves ahead 

with AFRICOM,” Pambazuka News, De- 

cember 10, 2009, http://www.pambazuka. 

org/en/category/features/60921. 

2 Ibid. 

3 Edward S. Herman. “Obama and the 

Steady Drift to the Right,” Z magazine, 

March 2010, 8. 

4 Sean McFate, “US Africa Command: A 

New Strategic Paradigm?” Military Re- 

view, January-February 2008; and Laura 

Plauch, “Africa Command: US Strategic 

Interests and the Role of the US Military 

in Africa,” CRS Report for Congress, March 

10, 2008, 4. 

5 McFate. “US Africa Command.” 

6 Jeff Schogol, “Africa Command Plans Ap- 

proved by Bush, DOD Officials Confirm,” 

Stars and Stripes, December 30, 2006. 

7 Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Sec- 

retary of Defense for Policy, State Depart- 

ment Foreign Press Center Briefing, June 

22, 2007.

8 Mark Malan, "US Civil-Military Imbalance

for Global Engagement," Refugee In-

 

17 Volman, “Africom.” 

 

18 Ward, Testimony Before the House 

Armed Services Committee, March 2009, 

38. 

19 M. J. Williams, “The coming revolution 

in foreign affairs: rethinking American na- 

tional security,” International Affairs 84:6 

(2008) 1109-1129; and Brian J. Atwood, 

Peter M. McPherson, and Andrew Nat- 

sios, “Arrested Development: Making For- 

eign Aid a More Effective Tool,” Foreign 

Affairs 87:6 (2008) 123-132. 

20 Williams, “The coming revolution,” 

1123. 

21 McFate, “US Africa Command.” 

22 Charles Maechling, Jr. “Counterinsur- 

gency: The First Ordeal By Fire,” Low In- 

tensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proin- 

surgency and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, 

eds. Michael T. Klare and Perter Kornbluh 

(New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 21. 

23 Ibid, 22. 

24 Ibid, 38. 

25 Ibid, 27 and 28. 

26 Michael Klare and Peter Kornbluh, “The 

New Interventionsim: Low-Intensity War- 

fare in the 1980s and Beyond,” Low Inten- 

sity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsur- 

gency and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, eds. 

Michael T. Klare and Perter Kornbluh, 

(New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 9. 

27 Ibid. 

28 Michael Klare, “The Interventionist 

Impulse: US Military Doctrine for Low- 

Intensity Warfare,” Low Intensity Warfare: 

Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and An- 

titerrorism in the Eighties, eds. Michael T. 

Klare and Perter Kornbluh, (New York: 

Pantheon Books, 1988), 59. 

29 Ibid, 75. 

30 Ibid, 55 and 56. 

31 Ibid, 76 and 77. 

32 Ward, Testimony Before the House 

Armed Services Committee, March 2010, 

28. 

33 Ibid and Volman, “Obama moves 

ahead.”